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Introduction
In October 1993, when Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications,
Inc. (TCI) announced plans for possibly the largest merger in United
States history, the New York Times gave cautious approval. The
Times, however, argued that the government should require Bell Atlantic to fulfill its promise to divest itself of TCI-owned cable systems
within Bell Atlantic's service area.' Curiously, the Times did not note
that earlier that summer a Bell Atlantic affiliate had convinced a district court to strike down a federal statute that banned telephone company provision of cable programming within its service area as a
violation of the First Amendment.2 One must wonder about a policy
that Congress embodies in a statute, the Times recommends, Bell Atlantic publicly announces it will accept, but that, at Bell Atlantic's request, a federal court finds insupportable. This Article examines that
policy and it considers the rationale and constitutionality of a prohibition against phone company provision of cable programming.
The proposed merger of Bell Atlantic and TCI fell apart. Predictably, corporate America united in publicly blaming this purportedly bad result (since it presumably slows the development of the
"information highway") on government regulation of cable rates. Al-3
ternative explanations, ranging from those related to corporate egos
to strategic assessments are at least equally plausible. Bell Atlantic
realized that it was paying too much per cable subscriber and that it
could provide its own cable service much more cheaply. In any event,
the collapse of the merger does not mean the issue will go away. Since
then, cable companies have announced plans to offer telephone service, and telephone companies have made plans to offer cable.4 With-

1. The Cable-Phone Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at A29.
2. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993)
[hereinafter Potomac Telephone]. Although the Times did note that separation of ownership was "no longer required by law," readers were not told the reason was that Bell Atlantic had gotten the prior ban declared unconstitutional, thereby casting some doubt
about its promise to divest itself of TCI operations in the Bell Atlantic regime. The Times
was alert enough, however, to indicate its view of the worth of Bell Atlantic's promisesthe Times thought a "legal safeguard" was necessary. The Cable-PhoneRevolution, supra
note 1, at A29.
3. For an entertaining account of how peculiarities of corporate egos can determine
the partners for and content of corporate mergers within the communications realm involving billions of dollars, see RICHARD M. CLURMAN, To THE END OF TIME (1992) (discussing
the Time, Inc. and Warner Communications merger).
4. Edmund L. Andrews, Sweeping Revision in Communication Is on the Horizon,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at Al.
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out regulatory restraint, competition seems to represent at least the
mid-term future.5
The statute held unconstitutional by the district court in Potomac
Telephone is not the only legal basis for requiring divesture in cases
like the proposed Bell Atlantic and TCI merger. The statute's bar on
telephone company provision of cable services in its service area was
presumably premised on the desirability of separating common carriage from supplying of content.6 Alternatively, irrespective of this

policy, in pursuit of its vision of a two-wire world with completion
between phone and cable, the FCC has recommended allowing the

phone company to provide cable programming over its own lines even
as it recommends continuing to prohibit phone company purchase of
cable systems within its service area. 7 Nevertheless, both the announced plans by single companies to provide both types of service
and the district court decision illustrate a current trend toward merg-

ing common and private carriage in an increasingly deregulated communications realm.
In contrast, since reading Bruce Owen's book on the economics
of free speech 8 nearly twenty years ago, I have accepted the presump-

tion that a better communications environment usually results by separating ownership of carriage facilities from provision of content, and
by requiring the carriage to be offered on a common carrier basis. For
5. "Mid-term" rather than "short term" because installing appropriate switching capacity at both ends of the line and signing up customers will take time, and rather than
"long term" in that it is very possible competitive forces will show that lines into the home
represent a natural (or regulatorily created) monopoly such that eventually each area will
have only one line carrier, which will supply cable, phone, and other services.
6. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988) provides in
relevant part:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to
subchapter II of this chapter, to provide video programming directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate
owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with the common carrier.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to
subchapter II of this chapter, to provide channels of communications or pole line
conduit space, or other rental arrangements, to any entity which is directly or
indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with
such common carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in
connection with, the provision of video programming directly to subscribers in the
telephone service area of the common carrier.
7. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54 - 63.58, Second Report and Order; Recommendation to Congress, and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, paras. 109-11, 135 (1992) [hereinafter Video
Dialtone Report].
8. BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1975).
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example, in its Video Dialtone Report, the FCC interpreted the statutory ban on telephone company "provision" of video programming as
a ban on the phone company selling but not on its "transporting" the
content to subscribers.' The separation of carriage and provision
combined with the common carriage requirement normally assures
greater access opportunities for content creators who do not have capital to provide their own transmission since they otherwise could face
refusal or various forms of discrimination by those owning the transmission system. The result should be a more open and diverse communications order.
This presumption in favor of separating carriage from content
provision seems to be the premise behind invalidated section 533(b),
which codified an earlier FCC policy. Even if the trend against such
regulation is presently irreversible, this Article offers an evaluation of
the Potomac Telephone decision. Finally, I conclude with some abbreviated remarks concerning where policy might usefully move, even
without a separation mandate.
The district court's constitutional analysis consisted of two parts.
After a lengthy analysis, it decided to apply an "intermediate" standard of First Amendment review. In a much shorter section dealing
with the substance of the law, the court decided the statute did not
effectively promote the government's purposes and, therefore, was
unconstitutional under the required intermediate scrutiny. Although
presented in a thoughtfully written opinion, I think that both conclusions were wrong-probably legally wrong given existing precedent,
and certainly wrong as a matter of desirable constitutional and policy
analysis. In support of this claim, Section I offers an alternative way
to approach the constitutional issue. Section II considers general arguments favoring regulation in the communications industry that may
support section 533(b).
I
Constitutional Evaluation of Structural Regulation
Free speech is a fundamental aspect of individual liberty. However, the speech of corporate entities that are composed of many people and that rely on a monetarily-based command structure will not be
9. References throughout to phone "provision" of video programming imply telephone company ownership and control over the programming package, while phone "carriage" or "transport" implies only that it delivers programming owned and packaged by
others, for example, a cable or programming company. Nothing in the argument against
phone provision of cable objects to phone carriage or delivery of cable or other video
programming.
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uniformly an aspect of, as opposed to a denial of, individual expressive
liberty. The speech of these entities often will conflict with the values

or preferences of the people making up the organizations, and thus
cannot be said to be an aspect of their liberty. Moreover, it is only
such entities, not individuals, that are potentially subject to structural
regulation. This follows because structural regulation merely governs
the relations between individuals without dictating to any individual
her own values or expressive choices-although, like any legal rule,
structural regulation affects the distribution of resources available to
different people and thereby affects the resources they have available
for expressive uses. Presumably, the institutional press and corporate
entities within the communications industry receive First Amendment
protection under the press clause 10 because this constitutional protection advances various human values. Protection broadly serves demo-

cratic decision-making

and democratic culture by preventing

government censorship of diverse information and perspective and it

shields the press in the performance of its more specific "watchdog"
functions."
My claim is that these considerations, both theoretically and as a
matter of case law, justify the government playing a conscious role in
structuring the communicationg infrastructure except when the gov-

ernment's ends or its means of advancing its ends involve undermining the industry's effectiveness at serving its constitutional roles.

In Potomac Telephone,'2 the district court rejected the view that
structural regulation of the media is presumptively valid. It also rejected the related notion that, as the government argued, the court
should use a rationality standard of review. 3 It argued that all but
one of the cases relied upon to support general governmental power
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom...
of the press." Id.
11. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FoUND. RES. J. 521.
12. 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
13. See id. at 917. The emphasis on levels of review pervades the scholarly literature
as well as typical legal briefs. This obscures the real tasks, which should be specifying
constitutional evils that might justify invalidating a regulation and determining whether the
regulation causes any of those evils. If the evils are of the sort I suggest, the crucial inquiry
would be to determine whether the regulation actually has a legitimate purpose. Rather
than determine the stringency of a balancing analysis, the inquiry should aim at identifying
whether the law exhibits any constitutionally specified faults. The Potomac Telephone
court remarkably devoted over nine of its fifteen pages of constitutional discussion to what
is described as the "fundamental constitutional question," that is, identifying "the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied," and less than five pages to evaluating the
statute. Id.
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to engage in structural regulation involved broadcasting. 4 The district court distinguished these precedents because in broadcasting the
"physical scarcity of electromagnetic frequencies" justifies regulation. 15 Moreover, it read the one other case, Associated Press v.
United States,'6 as only standing for the proposition that "the media

may be subjected to economic
regulations that are generally applica17
ble to all industries.'
Such quick rejection of all broadcast cases was unsound. Typical
First Amendment analyses assume government cannot burden the exercise of a First Amendment right. Restricting newspaper and broadcasting cross-ownership means newspapers lose the opportunity to
obtain a broadcast license solely because newspapers exercise the
right to publish. Of course, not everyone can own a broadcast station.
Still, the surprising bottom line in FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting" was that an entity can lose the opportunity to do so
specifically on the basis of engaging in a First Amendment activity.
The National Citizens decision must be seen as holding that government sometimes can impose structural regulations specifically on
newspapers to improve the communications order.
National Citizens, where the newspaper company was not allowed
to own the other "regulated" communication medium, is startlingly
analogous to the prohibition on cable and telephone cross-ownership.
Few authorities dispute that the government can require a telephone
company to get a license or its equivalent. In other words, not everyone can own a telephone system. Thus, even if the Court treats a
cable system like a newspaper, 19 the ban on the cable system and telephone combination surely violates the cable system's rights no more
than the ban on the newspaper and broadcaster combination violated
the newspaper's right. Potomac Telephone appears to give cable
greater constitutional rights of ownership than are given to
newspapers.
The more serious error in dismissing the relevance of the broadcasting cases is ubiquitous in both judicial and scholarly commentaries. The common claim is that physical scarcity justifies structural
14. Id.
15. Id. at 918.
16. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
17. Potomac Telephone, 830 F. Supp. at 921.
18. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
19. Later I argue cable should be treated constitutionally as more analogous to telephone than to either newspapers or broadcasting.
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regulation in broadcasting.2" Something close to the converse is true,
however. Structural regulation created scarcity, yet that structural
regulation as well as the structural regulations that respond to this
legally created scarcity are considered permissible means of constructing a communications system which best serves First Amendment
values.2 '
Economists and many lawyers have poked fun at the physical
scarcity argument. For example, a physical scarcity of printing presses
could exist if the government made them available for free, or allowed
anyone to use any printing press she saw. Physical scarcity of wood
pulp might occur if pulp were free and has occurred during some war
times and in many countries under price control. On the other hand,
if the government created property rights in broadcast frequencies as
it does in printing presses or wood pulp, no scarcity would exist. The
supply of broadcast outlets would meet the demand at the market
price. If instead, actual societal scarcity in terms of numbers were
considered, there would be, as the Court noted, far fewer daily papers
than broadcasters. 22
Although the "scarcity" concept has captured the popular imagination, the Court's own analyses are often more sophisticated. In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,23 Justice White described the consequences of the airwaves being a "commons" (my word, his description) where "the problem of interference is a massive reality" 24 (like
where no one owns the pastures or in my hypothesized world where
no one owns the printing presses). White explained that "[i]t was this
fact and the chaos which ensued from permitting anyone to use any
frequency ' 25 that made government intervention necessary.2 6
The chosen form of government intervention involving broadcasters was licensing. But Justice White proceeded to point out that
20. See id. This obviously justifies only regulations to open broadcasting up, not to
keep material out, which was why the Court did not use this rationale in FCC v. Pacifica

Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), a fact that contributes to Pacifica being such a controversial
decision. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas Powe, Televised Violence: First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978).
21. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 261-62 (1989).
See also C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 421 (1993).
22. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-50 (1974). The numbers are subject to manipulation on the basis of categorization. For example, should daily

papers or all newspapers be compared with television broadcasters or radio and television
broadcast stations?
23. 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
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"nothing in the First Amendment... prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy."27 For Justice White, this was obvious: "[T]he
Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be
shared among all or some of those who wish to use it." 28
The story Justice White told is a story about society's need for,
and the government's authority to establish, a set of legal rights
needed to make a new means of communication usable. The Court
reasoned that, given the need for structural organization, the government can choose common carriers that share the facilities with all
those who wish to use them. The Court did not apply any high standards of First Amendment scrutiny in reaching these conclusions. It
did not assert that private ownership and private owner control, that
is, the newspaper model, was constitutionally required or even preferable even though it was (and is) possible. Apparently, the Court interpreted the First Amendment to bar only structural regulations
designed to restrict the openness or usefulness of the communications
medium. As explained by Justice White, the fairness doctrine did not
commit these transgressions. 29 The challenged law was intended to
make effective and open use of the airwaves. Moreover, Justice White
implicitly recognized that choosing the best structure is generally a
political matter, unless the political choice is implausible. Arguably,
the Court implicitly adopted a low level of scrutiny not because physical scarcity exists, but because structural regulation is generally permissible even if the regulation itself creates scarcity-as it did in
broadcasting by treating the relevant property (licenses) as something
applicants could obtain for free.
Like in Red Lion, the deeper logic of the constitutional analysis
in the earlier NBC v. United States3" broadly endorsed structural regulation. At the most overt level, Justice Frankfurter upheld a structural
regulation relating to station/network relations because broadcasting,
"unlike other modes of expression," was subject to a licensing requirement and because "the right of free speech does not include . . . the
right to use the facilities of radio without a license."31 But why is li27. Id. at 389.
28. Id. at 390-91. Mandatory sharing was the initial policy of the Federal Radio Commission, although this industry-captured agency systematically cut back on the allocations
to nonprofit stations and expanded the reach of commercial stations. See ROBERT W.
MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATI'LE FOR
THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993).

29. But see

BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY,

30. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
31. Id. at 227.

supra note 21, at 259-61.
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censing acceptable? Although portions of the analysis might be read
to suggest licensing as the necessary response to scarcity, the opinion
only demonstrates that the "fixed natural limitation" of the radio
spectrum makes "regulation... vital to its development" and requires
that "[m]ethods be devised for choosing from among the many who
apply."3 2 This, however, is again essentially the problem of the commons. Without regulation, everyone could graze their cattle on the
commons but the resulting overgrazing would leave useable pasture
for nobody. Similarly, "[w]ith everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard."3
In response to the commons, some method must be devised to
regulate use. The method of regulation could be private property licensing, or some sharing norms. Note, however, that the commons
metaphor describes virtually all situations without governmentally
recognized property rights or other regulatory regimes. Only where
scarcity is not a problem, as with air for breathing (at least before
pollution becomes such a problem that either behavioral regulation or
limited pollution rights becomes necessary), is some method of
"choosing users" not required. In other words, the Court in NBC
identified a problem for which private property is one among various
responses and a problem that equally exists in relation to broadcast
frequencies, land, highway lanes, 34 printing presses, and wood pulp.
The question, then, is whether there are constitutional limits on
the forms of structural response to the problem of scarcity. The Court
found Congress' choice to create licensing requirements that "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest,' 35 to be permissible. 36 The Court's only caveat was that "to
choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or
social views, or upon any other capricious basis" would present a
wholly different issue.37 The Court allowed Congress to choose the
form of structural regulation but refused to equate the structural regulation with more constitutionally suspect content regulation.
A large set of decisions have struggled with structural regulation
of cable. The most striking aspect of these judicial decisions was the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Cf
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 213, 216.
at 212.
id. at 213.
at 219.
at 215.
at 226.
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courts' uncertainty as to what analysis to use.3 8 Industry lawyers and
commentators often define the issue as turning on whether cable is
more like broadcasting or newspapers-with the implicit concession
that cable should receive at least the lesser protection granted broadcasting, a level of protection that is curiously assumed to be the midlevel O'Brien analysis. The possibility of viewing cable as in some respects like telephone has generally received much less attention.39
The Supreme Court left the issue almost entirely open 40 until this
year. Finally, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,41 the
Supreme Court rejected both the broadcasting and the newspaper
analogies, but approved applying mid-level O'Brien scrutiny that only
requires the government to show how Congress could reasonably expect the structural regulation to further a legitimate purpose.
Although the full implications of the Court's treatment of the
must-carry obligations imposed on cable operators is beyond the
scope of this Article, two observations are important. First, all members of the Court at least tentatively approved noncontent-based
structural regulation of cable where the regulation is intended and
could be reasonably expected to improve the quality or fairness of the
communications order. In a case where the district court had granted
the government summary judgment without even the introduction of
the full record on which Congress had acted, the majority remanded,
but only for the fact finding necessary "to assure that, in formulating
its judgments, Congress had drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence" or for "the introduction of some additional evidence to establish that [without the must-carry rules] the dropped or
repositioned broadcasters would be at serious risk of financial difficulty."42 Although viewing the must-carry rules as improperly content-based, even the dissent in Turner Broadcasting suggested that
mandatory common carriage, a structural regulation that would impose a much greater limitation on cable operators' speech and edito38., See, e.g., Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); Century Communications Corp. v. FCC,
835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified, 837 F.2d 517, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
39. Both Justices Souter and Scalia raised this possibility in oral argument in Turner
Broadcasting. 62 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Jan. 18, 1994).
40. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). In
earlier challenges to structural regulations of cable in ways that involved compelled speech,
the Court did not even consider the relevance of the First Amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (upholding requirement that cable system
engage in local cablecasting).
41. 114 S.Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
reh'g denied, 115 S.Ct. 30 (1994).
42. Id. at 2471-72.
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rial discretion, would be acceptable under the First Amendment.4 3
Second, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo44 as one of two ways of avoiding the

straightforward conclusion that the "must-carry" in cable equalled the
"must-carry" (that is, required publication of a reply) invalidated in
Tornillo. The Court read Tornillo to disapprove only the contentbased intrusion into the newspaper's publication decisions.45
Thus, in broadcasting and now apparently in cable, the controlling constitutional standards effectively follow the governmental regulatory scheme. Not surprisingly, this pattern is not limited to
broadcasting. The importance of telephones as a means of communication, rivals, if not surpasses, that of broadcasting and newspapers.
Even more than broadcasting, although seldom discussed by constitutional scholars (possibly because few imagine anything different), tele-

phones have been subject to constant structural regulation in a
manner dramatically inconsistent with the First Amendment rights of
the type that many commentators assume Tornillo guarantees for
newspapers. Telephone companies, unlike newspapers, must carry
speech with which they do not agree and are required to provide their
services at a price determined or regulated by the government. The
story seems to be, at least during the period when a new form of com-

munications technology is established, that the government can restrict the rights of owners of communications companies in any way
reasonably designed to support the communications order.
This analysis even fits the broadest rationale 46 for striking down
the right to reply law in Tornillo. In this view, given the historical
43. Id. at 2477.
44. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
45. Turner Broadcasting,114 S. Ct. at 2465.
46. The broad basis of decision in Tornillo was that the access provision "intru[ded]
into the function of editors." 418 U.S. 241, 242 (1974). However, the Court also provided
a narrower ground-that the law "punished" particular content, an unconstitutional practice that could deter political coverage. The Court observed that since the obligation to
print the outsider's speech results only because of the paper's earlier publication decision,
the obligation amounts to an impermissible penalty or burden on the newspaper's content,
with potentially damaging deterrent effects on the newspaper's editorial vigor. Id. at 258.
This narrower ground, adopted in Turner Broadcasting,is clearly consistent with upholding
most structural regulations. Most readers apparently read the Court's emphasis on "editors" in Tornillo to be a euphemism for "owners"-otherwise Tornillo apparently would
permit if not require protection of the editorial role from intrusion by governmentally recognized properly holders-that is, the owners. But cf. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra
note 21, at 250-71 (arguing that as to the crucial issue of "who" is identified as the press,
the government has legislative discretion).
To the extent that the press as an institution is considered instrumental, even the
Tornillo holding might not be solid if evidence persuasively shows that a reply right would
not generate self-censorship. For example, it seems unlikely that mandatory printing of
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development of newspapers, any interference with the developed role
of editors must be understood as interfering with the integrity of the
institution, and undermining, rather than supporting the communications system.47 But no historical understanding exists to block regulation of broadcasting, cable or telephone that promotes speech.
Reading the broadcasting cases as generally supportive of structural regulation, rather than being based on some "natural" scarcity,
conforms to judicial decisions involving other communications mediums. Although the district court in Potomac Telephone4" was technically correct that Associated Press49 only upheld application of a
general economic regulation to the press, normally an uncontroversial5° practice, the law required Associated Press to speak to (that is,
offer its releases to) those to whom it did not want to speak. More
importantly, the Associated Press Court justified its decision broadly
under the First Amendment.5 1 This language affirms the legitimacy of

structural regulation designed to improve the communications realm.
The Court said:
It would be strange indeed.., if the grave concern for freedom of
the press ... should be read as a command that the government was
without power to protect that freedom.... [The First Amendment]
does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom....
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the
retractions after court findings of falsity will deter the media's speech as much as the possibility of huge damage awards that are now granted. This might explain the view that retraction requirements, despite their similarity to the law struck in Tornillo, could be
upheld. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 368 n.3 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
47. Both the historical contingency of this understanding and the fact that it relates to
the instrumental desirability of particular institutional arrangements may explain why
other democratic countries with slightly different traditions, can reach radically different
conclusions on this issue. For example, although Germany, like the United States, would
invalidate mandatory flag salute out of respect for individual autonomy, Germany holds
that the right to reply to press accusations is not only permissible but, to some degree,
constitutionally required. (I thank Professor Fritz Kubler for discussion of this point.)
48. 830 F. Supp. 909, 921 (E.D. Va. 1993).
49. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
50. "Uncontroversial" does not exclude the media's lawyers, anxious to use the First
Amendment to free their corporate clients from any expensive legal obligations, from routinely challenging these regulations, often all the way to the Supreme Court. "Uncontroversial" means that the Court predictably, and usually unanimously, dismisses First
Amendment claims and that scholarly commentary seldom takes such claims seriously.
51. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20. The notion that the broadcast cases generally
support governmental power to engage in structural analysis and the view that Associated
Press is not merely a case upholding application of general legislation to the press are
suggested by Red Lion's three separate citations to the broad language in Associated Press
supporting structural regulation which aims to open up the marketplace of ideas. Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 387, 390 (1969).
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First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests. 2
Here, this language meant upholding structural regulation of the media in a manner that could reasonably be expected to improve the
communication opportunities of newspapers that had been denied access to Associated Press. The language is so broad, however, that
Henry Geller treats as fundamental what he labels the "Associated
Press principle," namely that "[tihe aim of the [First] Amendment, its
'underlying premise,' is to foster 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 53 Clearly, under
this interpretation, any structural regulation aimed at improving the
communications environment, especially increasing access by unpopular or underfunded groups, would be permissible.
Associated Press is not the only nonbroadcasting support for
broad governmental power to engage in media-specific structural or
economic regulation. For instance, special mailing rates have
amounted to subsidies designed to promote the newspaper and magazine industry. 4 The conditions imposed on obtaining these rates were
intended by Congress to affect the structure of the industry, promoting some communication practices and some categories of communication while discouraging others. 5 First Amendment challenges to
these provisions, like the provision that grants the special rate only to
papers or magazines that have a subscriber list (as opposed to publications sent to people who have not requested them), have routinely
been rejected. 6 In these cases, the courts' constitutional analysis required little more than that challenged provisions be rationally related
52. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
53. HENRY GELLER, FIBER OPTICS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW POLICY? 11 (Annenberg Washington Program, 1991) (citing Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20). I generally
agree with Geller's policy conclusions in his excellent and detailed analysis of the telephone industry. Among other conclusions, Geller supports the bar on a phone company's
offering cable services both within and outside its service areas. Nevertheless, in some
respects, for example, recognizing telephone company's First Amendment rights through a
quite strict application of the O'Brien standard, Geller advocates restricting government
power to engage in structural regulation more than is appropriate and accepts the applicability of a constitutional standard that could be turned on some of his regulatory proposals.
Id. at 36.
54. RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND
PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1700-1860 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Richard B. Kielbowicz, Origins of the Second-Class Mail Category, 18631879, 96 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1 (1986).
56. The Enterprises v. United States, 833 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding subscriber requirement). See generally Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
This subscriber requirement was originally an attempt to deny the subsidy to primarily
advertising sheets, thereby indicating Congress' conception of the proper aspects of the
press to encourage.
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to the government's goals-typically of furthering the government's
conception of a good communications order. 7 The Supreme Court
noted that these broad subsidy categories, which presumably have
structural effects on the print media, are not like conditioning mail
subsidies on the basis of viewpoint, a form of censorship that is presumably unconstitutional.5
The Court also treated an exemption of small newspapers from
certain employment laws as hardly meriting serious argument, noting
merely that this was "not a 'deliberate and calculated device' to penalize a certain group of newspapers. '59 More recently, the Court upheld
application of a general gross receipts tax on cable television, although
the law exempted scrambled satellite broadcast television, which the
Court treated as the same communications medium (differing only in
its delivery system). 60 Again, the Court chose not to apply a heightened level of review, not even the O'Brien test.61 It explained that the
fact that cable "is taxed differently from other media does not by itself
...raise First Amendment concerns. "62
These tax, mail subsidy, and labor laws distinguish among press
entities in granting benefits or exemptions. However, none of these
laws was challenged as making any portion of the press worse off than
if there were no special treatment of the press or of some portion of
the press. Therefore, these cases do not directly support the claim
that the government can adopt a law uniquely applicable to the press
if the law makes some factions of the press worse off than without the
law. Nonetheless, this is precisely what the Newspaper Preservation
Act 63 accomplishes. The Act allows certain newspapers to form joint
operating agreements (JOAs) that would violate otherwise generally
applicable antitrust laws.64 According to suburban and small market
newspapers, a JOA places them at a competitive disadvantage. 65
These papers claim the Newspaper Preservation Act leaves them in a
substantially worse competitive position than if antitrust laws applied
57. See, e.g., The Enterprises, 833 F.2d at 1226.
58. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1945).
59. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (quoting Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 290 (1936)); see also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1946).
60. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 444.
63. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-353, § 1, 84 Stat. 466 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
1801 et seq. (1988)).
64. Id.
65. See Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst, 704 F.2d 467, 481, 483 (1983).
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uniformly.66 Again without any form of heightened review, the Ninth
Circuit in Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst upheld this
structural regulation against First Amendment challenge.67 These
analyses of structural regulations differ dramatically in both approach
and result from the district court's opinion in Potomac Telephone. Despite earlier mixed results in the lower courts, Turner Broadcasting
apparently approved broad structural regulation of cable. Outside
cable, most cases contain no substantial discussion of level of scrutiny.
Usually, they do not invoke even a middle level, O'Brien analysis.
Each upheld the challenged structural regulation. In each area of
communications, including the print media, the courts' analyses proceeded largely like it does in broadcasting. Its primary warning has
been that the analysis would change if the court found the law embodied a bad purpose or tried "to suppress the expression of particular
ideas or viewpoints."68 In contrast, putting aside the special example
of Tornillo (where the regulation turned on speech content and arguably should not be viewed as a structural regulation), as far as I know
the Court has never found a structural regulation of the media that
rationally served the communications order to violate the First
Amendment.
Of course, court decisions can always be limited to their
precise
content-or rejected as wrong. Thus, the most important question is
how the First Amendment ought to apply to structural regulation of
the media. In the past, I have noted that a society concerned with
press freedom might only fear suppression or manipulation by the
government.69 On the other hand, society might also view private
power and market functioning as highly significant threats to a desirable communications order, as threats to diversity, and even as threats
to freedom as freedom is normally understood. This second perspective recognizes that mere reliance on laws of general applicability will
not ensure a communications realm that adequately serves a democratic society; such reliance will not produce "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources. "70
American legal practice historically has adopted this second view.
Postage regulations and subsidies, with their structural effects on
newspapers and magazines, have illustrated such a judgment from the
66. See Ruth Hawk, Justice Department Approval Needed for Paper's Sale, PA. L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1992, at 7.
67. 704 F.2d at 482-88.
68. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
69. See Baker, Private Power, supra note 21; BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 21,
chs. 10 & 11.
70. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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beginning of this country's history to the present.7 ' Major twentieth
century examples include federal and state regulation of telephone
services and rates, regulation of cable and broadcasting, governmental
support for public broadcasting, allocation of governmental advertising among competing partisan papers, and antitrust exemptions from
the Newspaper Preservation Act. In addition, there are many relatively low-visibility methods to influence the structure of the press.
For example, press passes and press facilities subsidize communication
of certain types of news and discrimination in allocating these passes
and facilities to benefit some elements of the press and disadvantage
others.72 Media critics have argued, often persuasively, that failures of
the market and the actual and potential behavior of private power
,create more severe problems than past remedial legislative responses
imply.73 Once these problems are understood, the justification for
past responses and the need for new, media-specific governmental responses become clear-with the constitutional guarantee of a free
press providing a basis for checking governmental abuse.
This second perspective recognizes that both freedom of the press
and, equally important, a communications order that serves the democratic functions of the press can be threatened from either direction,
that is, by either private or public power. Response to private threats
requires government intervention in the form of structural regulations. Press freedom in the functional sense embedded in constitutional theory and doctrine normally requires that these structural
regulations be upheld. But history clearly shows that not all government interventions are benign from the perspective of an open communications order. Thus, the Constitution imposes limits and
71. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 54. For a more critical view of this history, see RANDAU
P. BEZANSON, TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA: EXACTIONS ON THE PRESS FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1994).

72. Although courts would reject various viewpoints or suspiciously arbitrary reasons
to refuse press passes, see, for example, Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)
and Southwestern Newspapers Corp. v. Curtis, 584 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979), other
restrictions that give some portions of the press privileges denied to others are either accepted, Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (1977) (implicitly accepting requirements that journalist have a residence in Washington and be a bona fide journalist, presumably as
determined by the government), or have been upheld, Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 783 F.2d
1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Jersawitz v. Noonan, 479 U.S. 883 (1986)
(self-producer of cable access channel program denied press access because of regulation
designed to limit access to "responsible persons employed by and responsible to recognized media organizations") and Los Angeles Free Press v. Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d
448 (1970) (refusal to issue police press cards to specialized publications).
73. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (4th ed. 1992); C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
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empowers courts to strike down any government initiative designed to
censor or undermine the freedom or integrity of the press.
As both history and precedent have accepted this additional perspective, and as it has been supported by theory, the court in Potomac
Telephone applied the wrong standard. The court should have looked
at the purpose and the method of operation of the cable telephone
cross-ownership prohibition. As long as the law could have been used
as a means of improving or protecting an open and democratic communications order, and not as a tool to conduct censorship, the law
should have been upheld. The Potomac Telephone court, however,
apparently thought that the ban did not even meet this standard.74
Therefore, the next section reviews possible rationales for regulating
the communication infrastructure to see if any justifies the ban on
cable-telephone cross-ownership.
II
Regulatory Rationales
Any regulations of the rapidly changing and competitive realm of
communications may be misguided-as well as doomed given industry
opposition. The extreme position argues that regulation has no place
in future telecommunications. Telecommunications seems to be
"moving inexorably towards competition, deregulation, and fiber op' 75
tics, [with] the day ... not far off when entry will be wide open.
Only slightly more moderate is the apparent industry consensus on
the needed overhaul of the telecommunications system. According to
Tom Norris, AT&T's Vice-President for Government Affairs, "all
members of the industry at least have come to the point where they
agree what
the endgame is, which is to have competition wherever
76
feasible."
In the policy maker's rush toward open competition that will presumably spur development of the golden information superhighway,
important rationales for regulation may have been forgotten. Beyond
general economic goals of efficient delivery of services and prevention
of abuse of monopolistic power, at least three underlying principles
related to providing for a desirable communications order often support specialized regulatory treatment of the communications infrastructure. A fourth concern influencing attitudes toward regulation
74. Potomac Telephone, 830 F. Supp. 909, 931-32 (E.D. Va. 1993).
75. Eli M. Noam, From the Network of Networks to the System of Systems: An End of
History in Telecommunications Regulation?, in REGULATION 26, 26 (1993).
76. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Ready to Ease Its Legal Barriers in Communications,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993, at Al.
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also lies in the background, and should be specifically addressed. This
section examines each of these principles and considers whether any
justifies section 533(b)'s bar on telephone provision of video
programming.
First, communication products, including basic telephone and basic cable service, should be made as widely available as possible and
priced in a manner that allows virtually universal access (the universal
audience access principle). Second, creators and suppliers of communications products should have fair access to the transmission system
so as to have access to audiences (the speaker access principle). As a
corollary, the transmission system should not be empowered to exclude any speaker (the common carrier principle). Third, despite the
common carrier principle, some communications or communicators
should receive structural subsidies in order to increase the diversity or
quality of the communications realm beyond that which would result
from an unregulated and unsupplemented market (the support of diversity principle). One permissible method to further this end is to
charge some speakers a premium over cost and give others a discount
on the cost of services as a means of making the overall system more
open. Finally, structural choices should respond to the danger of corruption of the political process by concentrated corporate power. This
danger is especially great where, as here, the corporate power combines control over important elements of the communication infrastructure with control over the content of communications (the
political power principle).
A.

Universal Audience Access

Universal service within the communications realm has long been
a major policy goal. It has been a central emphasis of postal policy.
In its broadest sense, education is essential to much communication
and thus forms a basic part of a country's communications infrastructure. Every state of the union treats universal (free) public education
as fundamental. First Congress, and then the FCC, have favored
broadcast channel allocations designed to serve each community, even
though a more market driven approach would result in a greater geographical concentration of media outlets. Government policy has generally assumed that equity (and to some extent efficiency 77) requires
77. Network externalities reflect the advantage to each user of others being on the
network. That is, others in addition to the party paying for service are advantaged by the
party having phone service-most obviously, those others who would like to reach the
person by phone. That is, the value of the phone system to any user depends not merely on
her connection but also on other people being connected so that she can reach them.
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that everyone have access to a phone. Historically, telephone rate
regulation advanced universal service by various means, most obviously by charging some users a disproportionate 78 amount of the cost
of joint facilities. Sometimes, the impact is distributionally perverse,
such as when poor intercity users support suburban users. 79 Nonetheless, subsidies of residential users by business users, rural users by urban users, local service by long distance service, 80 and basic service by
enhanced services usually advance equitable goals. From the begin-

ning of the country, mail subsidies have been designed to make newspapers more available. Free public libraries have subsidized the broad
availability of books and other communication-oriented materials.
Thus, government policy aims to increase the availability of communi-

cations capabilities (education), personal communications (telephone), newspapers, books, and local broadcasting.
Communications subsidies take various forms. By requiring that
all customers are charged equally for phone and cable service, the
government is providing a subsidy to customers who cost more to
serve. In contrast, unequal "special" rates, often regulatorily required, sometimes make availability more equal. For example, lifeline
phone service is available to qualifying poor residents in New York
City for as little as one dollar per month with the initial installation fee
also much lower than for regular service. 8 ' This contrasts with situations where there are jointly used facilities but no equity-oriented governmental regulation. Here, the greater competitive power of volume
users often enables them to gain special favorable rates that effec-

However, market mechanisms may fail to bring these potential callers' [C] preferences
effectively to bear on the decision (or the financial ability) of a person [P] purchasing
service. (Of course, to some extent C may pay the phone company to connect P, for example, by charging P less, thereby bringing this preference to bear on the transaction between
the phone company and P.) Thus, subsidy arrangements that promote universal service
have some efficiency justification. They can correct for a market failure in accounting for
callers' preference to have people they want to call on the network.
78. If costs are really joint, there is no objective or neutral way to allocate them-the
allocation logically must reflect either value judgments (i.e., political judgments) or power.
The point here is that traditionally these value judgements have favored universal service.
79. Likewise, the inequity that would result if rural areas that are expensive to serve
are left to small, rural telephone companies, although often corrected through regulation,
contrasts unfavorably with the greater emphasis on universal service by the postal system.
80. ROBERT BRrTr HORWiTz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGU-

OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 274 (1989) (AT&T figures from 1984 indicate that only 10% of residential users make over $25 worth of long distance calls per
month and suggest that it is such users who were benefitted by the break-up of AT&T
despite the increased local rates).
81. NYNEX White Pages-Manhattan7 (1993).
LATION
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tively allocate joint costs more to weaker users, 2 often exacerbating
inequality.
Likewise, in broadcasting, mandated allocation of "free" licenses
to rural or small markets where an unregulated system would result in
the broadcast right being purchased by urban users amounts to a subsidy of rural service in the name of universal availability. At least in
intention, children who are expensive to educate receive an appropriate education at the same zero price as children who are less expensive to educate. State transfer programs that assertedly provide poor
districts the minimal resources thought necessary to provide for education likewise illustrate the policy to promote universal availability in
the education sphere.
These examples illustrate that the country is generally committed
to creating a communications infrastructure that allows for universal
access. This policy has justified extensive and discriminatory regulatory interventions. The need for these interventions is likely to last as
long as poverty exists. One recent study found that today over
twenty-five percent of the low income households in the New York
Telephone Company territory do not have phones.8 3 However, competitive forces and related technological innovations, by lowering
costs, can sometimes contribute more than many traditional regulatory schemes. For present purposes, the policy question is whether
this goal of universal service is advanced by traditional regulatory
practices or, more specifically, whether the ban on the phone company provision of video programming advances this goal.
Competition undoubtedly can create benefits, but it also often
can impose costs. Just as the Reagan and Bush administrations' deregulatory policies increased the disparity between the rich and poor,
an unregulated, market-oriented communications order runs the risk
of increasing the communications and information gap between rich
and poor. Robert Horwitz argues that among the effects of the AT&T
breakup and the related deregulation of telecommunications was reduced cross-subsidization, particularly for local, poor, and rural users
by long distance and volume users. The result is that "basic telephone
users ... pay higher rates and may look forward to a decline in the
quality of service. '' 84 Prevention of similar results for new communications technologies should be a major goal of communications policy.
82. See Noam, supra note 75, at 29 (discussing the Ramsey pricing rule).
83. HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 274 (citing statistics gathered by Public Utility Law
Project of New York and reported in Daniel W. Rosenblum, Phone-Industry Deregulation
Must Be Balanced; Not For the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1987, at A16).
84. Id.
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The evils of increased inequality are likely to outweigh purported benefits of new services or greater efficiency.
Competition can both undermine universal service and waste resources. When unregulated providers are able to offer service to high
volume, low cost users, the regulated utility loses some of its most
profitable business, thereby reducing the revenue available to subsidize universal service. For example, MCI's recently announced plan
to install fiber optic "driveways" for large local users is aimed at reducing the approximately five billion dollars per year that MCI presently pays local phone companies for access to the local exchange.85
MCI can split the savings between profit and lower charges to these
appreciative volume customers. However, local exchanges' revenue
will be reduced without any real reduction in costs. In part, these local exchanges may write off investments and live with lower profits,
although this may reduce the incentive for long term investment, including investment in facilities that serve low-volume users. Since local companies must maintain the revenues necessary for continued
provision of service, the most likely scenarios include charging the remaining local users for a larger share of the costs. Thus, "competitive" cream skimming by MCI predictably contributes to the
distributionally perverse result of pushing up rates for basic phone
service. 86
The above only claims that deregulated competition in general
can be detrimental to universal service and equitable goals. The question here is whether phone company provision of video leads to these
evils. The answer might be yes. Phone company ownership of unregulated businesses, 7 especially those that make joint use of the phone
transmission facilities, creates opportunities for abuse. For instance, if
the phone company has monopoly power over local phone service or
local switching8 8 but faces competition in providing video program85. Hubert B. Therring, Business Diary: January 2-7, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at C2.
86. This profitable competitive opportunity for MCI to siphon off these high volume
users can also result in over-investment in basic infrastructure (that is, economically wasteful, duplicative facilities). Of course, these comments hardly trace all the predictable (or
unpredictable) consequences of this competition-and some of these consequences are
likely to be socially favorable.
87. Even if the additional businesses are also regulated, the complexity of the regulatory task may increase sufficiently that the profit goals of the utility will stymie proper cost
allocations.
88. Monopoly local power is in apparent decline. For example, presently cellular and,
in the near future, cable and various new services provide competition. Switching, however, could create a monopolistic bottleneck. Cf. Bell Atlantic Telephone v. FCC, 24 F.3d
1441 (1994) (reversing and remanding FCC order that would have reduced local exchange
companies' control over switching).
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ming, its desire to gain market advantage in the video programming
market could give it an incentive to allocate more costs to the phone
rate base.89
Many ways exist for the phone company to allocate costs from
cable to phone, thereby subsidizing cable and burdening phone users.
The most direct method merely allocates more of the joint facility
costs to phone users than to cable users, but the methods of crosssubsidization by unified companies are endless. For example, a major
phone company "expense" is the cost of money. Most telephone operating companies have excellent credit ratings, which keep down
their cost of capital. Cable systems often have much worse ratings.
Mergers, like the now scrapped merger of Bell Atlantic and TCI, or
phone company direct investment in cable operations,90 can cause the
phone company's credit rating to decline, while the cable operation's
credit rating improves. The result pushes the cost of phone service up
and pulls the cost of cable down.
Regulators make heroic efforts. Nevertheless, as long as two or
more "products" rely on the same facilities and real depreciation does
not reflect the extent of use, allocating costs between users will remain
discretionary. Because the economic and factual inquires are difficult
and intertwined with value and policy judgments, and because the
phone company is such a powerful legal, lobbying, and advocacy
force, even if regulators always have adequate resources, commitment, and integrity it would be naive to expect complete regulatory
success. Pragmatically, better institutional design would place fewer
demands on regulators. Here, the less demanding design is to have
separate ownership of the two functions: transmission and provision
of content.
Despite these concerns, this game of preventing the use of local
phone bases to cross-subsidize other ventures may already be lost, irrespective of a ban on telephone company provision of video. Alternatively, basic telephone service may be sufficiently available to all
users so that potential battles motivated by equity in this area will not
89. One incentive to allocate these costs to the phone rate base is that traditional
"cost-plus" regulation then allows the phone company to set rates higher in order to recover these costs. The newer "rate cap" regulation reduces this incentive. The company
can profit by reducing costs but not by inflating costs because the rate is capped. Long
term, however, rate caps will inevitably be subject to adjustment. Therefore, the phone
company could still benefit by making costs appear on the regulated business' side of the
ledger. Moreover, any incentive it has to be more competitive in or to monopolize the
cable business could still lead it to subsidize those operations.
90. Given the currently high selling price of cable systems, there is some evidence that
this direct investment will be the preferred strategy of most phone companies. See, e.g.,
GTE Plans Video Network to Compete with Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at D2.
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occur. Phone companies' involvement in unrelated, non-regulated enterprises already allows some cross-subsidies that burden the rate
base, although regulatory separations of costs may be comparatively
effective to the extent there is less use of common facilities. More
relevant are the phone company's opportunities to profit from businesses that either make joint use of phone facilities or involve advanced use of the facilities in ways the phone company is uniquely
able to facilitate. Joint use and added services are a part of the rational, economical, and full use of the telephone infrastructure. Thus,
these uses potentially help pay for the facilities needed for basic service and, therefore, should not be barred. However, cost allocations
directed toward basic services may inappropriately increase the apparent profitability of these services while disadvantaging basic service.
This reasoning underlies the FCC's decision to permit local
phone companies to offer video dialtone services.91 As defined by the
FCC, "video dialtone" requires a basic "video platform" operated
under common carrier obligations. From such a platform, the FCC
would allow both the telephone company and other users to provide
video "gateways" that are not subject to common carrier regulation,
although the phone companies still cannot provide (sell to end users)
video programming. A video gateway apparently provides the public
with a framework that can offer everything now provided by a cable
company and more. Thus, "video dialtone" permits the phone companies to compete with cable companies in the carriageof packaged and
unpackaged video. In trying to obtain this carriage business, the
phone companies might allocate disproportionate costs of joint facilities to their regulated monopoly switching or local audio uses. The
potential for this abuse exists within the video dialtone regime, but
that regime probably helps facilitate the best use of the companies'
infrastructure facilities.92 If this "tax" on phone users constitutes the
evil attributed to phone companies owning cable facilities, then the
question becomes whether phone provision of video (as opposed to
carriage allowed under video dialtone) creates important additional
opportunities and incentives to impose disproportionate costs on the
basic phone users.
91. Video Dialtone Report, supra note 7, paras. 109-14, 135.
92. The additional use of phone lines could result in lower phone costs. Alternatively,
this business opportunity might lead the phone company to make expensive facility upgrades that offer little or no benefits for the basic phone users even though they might be
forced to help pay for them. Of course, policymakers might welcome this method of financing initial construction of the "information highway." Regardless, potentially objectionable distributional effects should not be ignored.
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The answer is "probably not." Two caveats are possible. First,
the value of monopolizing video transport might increase if the phone
companies could also provide programming, thereby increasing already existing incentive to impose costs on phone users. Second, telephone companies' entry into the programming business could be
counter-productive if the communications system would be best
served by the phone companies devoting their full attention and effort
toward providing the best transport systems.93 Although the issue is
debatable, neither of these possible effects seem sufficient in themselves to justify section 533(b)'s prohibition of telephone company
provision of video programming.
Even if phone company provision of programming created relatively few problems with universal phone service beyond those already created by the carriage of programming, this hardly undermines
possible justifications for the current regulatory regime. First, other
justifications (discussed below) may exist for limiting telephone entry
into programming. Second, the major policy argument favoring telephone entry into carriage, that this makes most economical use of
phone facilities (i.e., the lines and switches) does not support permitting telephone companies to provide programming themselves. If
phone companies can profitably use their facilities to carry cable type
programming to private residences, they would, if allowed, provide
this service even if not allowed to own the programming. Video programmers, or even additional cable systems, could then compete with
the current cable companies, using the phone companies for their carriage needs. In contrast, minimal public gain would come from phone
companies owning these competing video products.
One wire going into each home, carrying competing video (cable
systems), computer, phone, and possibly other new services, may even
constitute the most efficient use of resources. As long as the wire (including installation, maintenance, necessary switches, and the physical
line itself) constitutes a substantial portion of the transmission system's cost, and as long as one wire has sufficient capacity to meet the
needs for all relevant uses, using two wires would be wasteful. Thus,
any regulatory system that forbids combinations of phone and video
carriage is presumably irrational on economic grounds-although
competitive concerns, safeguarding against system breakdowns, or
more complex economic considerations might overcome this
presumption.
93. This consideration is not quite the same as the universal-service goal, but it is discussed here because it is a potentially objectionable impact that cross-ownership could
have on the provision of phone service.
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Nevertheless, a developing consensus reportedly assumes a twowire future, probably with both phone and cable wire competing to
provide both services.94 While not blanching at the possibility of the
"worst case" scenario of a one wire world, Thomas Hazlett asserts that
"competition can and will endure." 95 He argues that cable's existing
physical plant is a sunk cost, leaving "the future costs of these facilities
96 Since these facilities will not need quick replace... close to zero."
ment, Hazlett argues that this cost basis will allow cable to stay competitive. Nevertheless, as new video products or expanded versions of
cable require more advanced lines, it may become more economically
efficient for everyone to rent space on the cheapest available largecapacity line as opposed to upgrading any existing lines. Thus, Hazlett's view may be too short term. In any event, the point remains
that the correct resolution of the transport issue is irrelevant to
whether the carrier ought to be permitted to provide the content.
B. Speakers Access and Common Carriage

Continuing vigilant efforts to promote universal telephone service are important. Still, from the perspective of the overall system of
free expression, probably the more pressing need is to assure accessavailability for the broadest and most diverse constellation of communications creators and producers. This was the premise for Bruce
Owen's claim that First Amendment values are best advanced by separating media products from delivery systems. 97 Many media producers, especially those that are small, diverse, dissident, or less
profitable, will not be able to afford their own delivery systems. If
they must obtain transport from an entity that sells competing media
content, they are likely to face refusal or discrimination, whether for
ideological or, more probably, for economic reasons. Cable companies exhibit this behavior when they exclude local television channels
or new cable networks that would compete with channels in which the
cable system has ownership interests. Telephone companies have a
94. Andrews, supra note 76. Although the FCC currently is promoting a "two-wire"
world, the jury is still out on whether this is competitively sustainable and economically
desirable. In contrast, public policies concerned to reduce the economic waste implicit in
duplicate facilities as well as the desire to make use of monopoly revenues to subsidize
universal service, led local and state governments early in the century to replace semicompetitive telephone markets with regulated monopolies. See Warren G. Lavey, The
Public Policies That Changed the Telephone Industry Into Regulated Monopolies: Lessons
from Around 1915, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 171 (1987).
95. Affidavit of Thomas W. Hazlett at paras. 38-43 (Apr. 29, 1993), submitted to the
court in Potomac Telephone, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
96. Id.
97. OwEN, supra note 8.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[Vol. 17:97

long history of trying to exclude interconnection or other service to
potentially competing providers. Some phone companies' explanation
for their desire to exclude dial-a-porn services-namely that many of
their customers disapprove of these communications 98-is ominous
from the perspective of a constitutional system designed to protect
dissident speech. 99 The obvious solution is to require separate ownership of content and carriage and to mandate carriage on a common
carrier basis.
I find it difficult to quarrel with this argument. Regulators could
formally mandate that the delivery systems operated by major programmers guarantee smaller media producers fair access. Still, the
danger of difficult or expensive to prove impediments seems obvious.
On the other hand, if fair access is really guaranteed, there seem few
reasons why the communications order benefits from media producers' or programmers' owning delivery systems. 10 0 In any event, the
most important consideration should be promoting openness and diversity. This objective does not seem served, and could be impeded, if
existing common carriers diversify into programming or media production. It is not served because any programming that common carriers would have an incentive to provide, independent entities should
have equal incentives to provide. In contrast, the entry of telephone
companies into programming could lead to their skimping on their
devotion to carriage. Even more important from the perspective of
the system of freedom of expression, merging delivery and programming could lead to carriers skewing delivery to favor their own products. This is the central argument in favor of section 533(b).
The system of freedom of expression requires institutional arrangements that promote rather than impede people's opportunities
to communicate. Censorship, whether by governmental, private, or
structural forces, is presumptively objectionable. As Justice Hugo
Black so clearly put it, "[f]reedom of the press from governmental
98. See Carlin Communications v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
99. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
(1990).
100. The major counter-argument is that program ownership will provide a source of

profits or capital necessary to build the delivery systems. The force of this argument seems
minimal. Assuming the phone company is unable to earn monopolistic profits by participating in the programming market (which, if it could, would mean that the regulatory attempt to mandate fair access had failed), it should expect to earn as much profit from
building the delivery system and charging profitable program suppliers for carriage as from
building a system to deliver its own programming. Moreover, the separation of delivery
and programming reduces the capital requirements on the builders of delivery systems
because they would not be required to invest in expensive programming.
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interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests."'' The aim should be structure
that promotes creative opportunities and facilitates audience access to
diverse cultural, partisan, and informational communication. Mail,
telephone, broadcasting, and cable illustrate contexts in which government intervention, and sometimes government operated or licensed
monopolies, have promoted diversity and access better than the unregulated marketplace. 10 2
Common carriage is essentially a guarantee that a utility, here the
phone company, will not arbitrarily or invidiously deny access. Structurally separating the delivery system from content ownership and
mandating equal access reduces the incentive for the private carrier to
censor. Common carriage must, however, be interpreted from the
perspective of its First Amendment, not only an economic efficiency,
rationale. In a generally persuasive partial dissent to the FCC's Video
Dialtone Report and Order,0 3 Commissioner James Quello argued
that a single wire into the home is unsafe: "we simply cannot afford to
give one entity that much control over the information that flows to
the home" even if it is regulated as a common carrier. 04 Quello's
point gained force in light of an arguably aberrational decision of the
Ninth Circuit that upheld the right of "common carrier" phone companies to deny service on the basis of message content. 0 5 Even
though "dial-a-porn" messages (indecent but not obscene) were not
illegal, the court reasoned that a common carrier could deny carriage
on the basis of a business judgment that this carriage would be bad for
its reputation and, hence, bad for business.
Quello's solution, a second wire into the home, is inadequate.
The owner of the second wire is often likely to engage in the same
censorship, for the same reasons, as the owner of the first wire. 0 6 Du101. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (footnote omitted).
102. I use the term "unregulated market" with misgivings, since, fundamentally, there is
no such thing. Choices among property regimes and among various alternative contract
rules illustrate that all markets rely on legal structuring or regulation. There is no "neutral" or "natural" regime that should be called a "free" market. Cf Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contracts Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
103. Video Dialtone Report, supra note 7, at 5875-79.
104. Id. at 5878.
105. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988); see also Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1986).
106. The second wire could help to the extent the denial of access was due to the delivery system's owner also owning programming that competes with the party seeking access
(e.g., it could help in promoting "variety"). Less clear is that it would help increase "diversity." For example, it would change little to reduce the ideological or economic incentives
to censor unpopular content.
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plicative censorship by owners with similar values, or operating under
similar economic constraints, often occurs, as the competing television
networks illustrate. A more promising response would be to make
common carriage mean what it should mean-a solution that the FCC
could order, Congress could require, and, I would urge, the Constitution mandates. 107 The Circuit Court's decision, which Quello rightly
fears, should be disregarded and treated as simply wrong.
The primary argument for section 533(b) is that it helps make the

common carrier requirement effective. If the phone company only
carries video, it might allocate cable transmission expenses to basic
phone service and thereby gain a subsidy for its video carriage, and
possibly create a monopoly in that carriage market. But as long as
common carriage requirements apply, a carriage monopoly would not
restrict video programmers' access to the public. On the other hand,
if the phone company sells programming to the public, it would have
an incentive to allocate some programming costs to its regulated monopoly services, thereby subsidizing its video program offerings. Likewise, the phone company would have an incentive to impose obstacles

on competing programmers that would be difficult to prove. As a re107. Doctrinally, finding state action is the key component to asserting a constitutional
mandate for common carriage-or, at least, a mandate that carriers not deny access on the
basis of speech content. As a central part of the communications infrastructure, the phone
system is analogous to the streets of the company-town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (finding state action and holding private owner could not keep "trespassing" speakers off its streets). A phone company's primary function is to provide for the public's
communications, a function implicit in the government's extensive regulations of the phone
industry. This function partly explains why many countries favor public ownership. Extensive government supervision, justified by the importance of providing fair terms of universal access to the public, implicates the government in any decision by the utility to deny
service to a category of users. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 374
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating a belief that the Court would find the state's
involvement sufficient to impose a nondiscrimination obligation so that a utility could not
deny service to Negroes or other suspect groups).
The Court's recent tendency to find state action only if there is a connection between
the government and the specific challenged act generally cuts against a finding of state
action. But when government action clearly contributes to the opportunity of the actor to
engage in the challenged action-as have government actions in structuring the telephone
industry-the Court has often found state action without government participation in the
actual challenged decision. Cf Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(state action in defense counsel's use of a peremptory challenge and citing with approval
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Garage, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
This reasoning suggests that requiring cable systems to provide access opportunities,
rather than simply interfere with the cable system's First Amendment rights, is constitutionally mandated. In a suit against Kansas City for eliminating its requirement that the
cable system operate an access channel, where the city had granted only one cable
franchise, the ACLU asserted that access provisions were constitutionally required. See
MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 898-99 (4th ed. 1990).
The suit was dropped when the city reinstated the access channel.
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sult, the phone company would gain an inefficiently large segment of
the video market, potentially even gaining monopoly power. As opposed to when the wire merely operated as a common carrier, phone
company ownership of programming could encourage it to sharply restrict access to the public for independent and diverse video producers' access to the public.
In arguing to allow the phone company to provide cable programming, Thomas Hazlett asserts "[t]here is simply no dispute: when
one begins with monopoly, new entry can only increase the amount of
consumer choice.'1 0 8 Maybe. 10 9 But this point does not show that
unrestrained phone company entry should be allowed. The initial monopoly to which Hazlett refers is the cable company's existing monopoly. The proper question in respect to section 533(b) is whether the
phone company becomes competitive as a program provider or only
as a carrier. If the phone company could profit by offering programming, one or more independent programmers should be equally able
to profit by offering programming. However, phone company provision of programming could give the phone companies an incentive to
favor their own programming, thereby disadvantaging any independent programmers. Then the phone company could become a monopolistic bottleneck similar to that which currently exists in the cable
industry. This would clearly be a less desirable result and could reduce consumer's choices as compared to the likely result if the phone
company operates solely as a carrier. Limiting the phone company to
carriage creates an incentive for it to encourage demand for transmission by more programmers, potentially increasing diversity, accessibility for programmers, and availability for the residential public. Prima
facie, this approach is preferable.
C. Subsidized Support for Merit and Diversity Programming
The premise of many governmental communications policies is
that markets do not adequately support some communications that
108. Hazlett, supra note 95, para. 44.
109. This claim is wrong in some circumstances. For example, if competition wastes
resources by duplicating services and dissipating revenues that the monopolist, possibly
because of regulatory mandate, would devote to diverse programming, competition could
increase the total quantity of low-grade programming and, at the time, reduce diversity,
consumer satisfaction, and consumer choice. Commentators often rely on this point to
explain why the owner of a monopoly made up of three networks might provide more
diverse programming and waste fewer resources than would three competitive broadcast
networks. A court properly relied on these considerations in concluding that protecting a
local broadcaster from additional competition could, in certain circumstances, serve the
public interest in programming. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
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are valuable from the perspective of freedom of expression. 110 The
concern with availability of diverse and quality communications has
justified not only a regulatory promotion of open access (i.e., the common carrier principle) but also regulatory mechanisms to subsidize expression inadequately supported by the market. The subsidization can
either come directly from the government or through a government
mandated diversion of monopoly profits. Governmental regulation
within the communications realm often attempts to achieve this second form of subsidy. In broadcasting, the government's attempts to
promote communications have not received adequate market support.
Thus, although in broadcasting governmental attempts to promote
communications inadequately supported by the market sometimes
take the form of direct subsidies for noncommercial or public television and radio as well as direct allocation of frequencies to these activities, they also take the form of requiring diversion of the
broadcaster's resources (possessed in part because of broadcasters'
quasi-monopolistic position"') in order to fulfill their public interest
programming obligations." 2 In fact, a major critique of deregulation
in broadcasting is that it undermines this important practice-a critique embodied in the subsequently enacted Children's Television Act
of 1990. 1 In the postal system, promotion of a non-market level of
some communications leads to special low rates for some categories,
such as some mail of some nonprofit organizations, with the same
rates presumably subsidized partly by the government and partly by
other "speakers" who use the mail. In cable, this diversion and man110. Elsewhere I have argued both that fully "competitive" unregulated markets cannot
be expected to produce "efficient" production and distribution of communications and,
even if they did, that efficiency is often not an acceptable standard for evaluating the production and distribution of cultural, informational, and argumentative communications.
BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 73, at ch. 3.
111. This provides the rationale for the currently discredited Carroll doctrine, which
justified denying a license to a potential competitor of an incumbent broadcaster despite
physically available spectrum-space if the FCC concluded that competition would be economically detrimental to both stations' capacity to serve the public interest. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In eventually repudiating the doctrine,
the FCC explained that their repudiation only precluded consideration of such economic
effects in the context of individual licensing decisions, not in rule making or policy making.
In re Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcasting Stations on
Existing Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 2276 (1989). Past acceptance of the Carroll doctrine, which allowed the government to deny use of physically available spectrum, illustrates that public interest considerations, not physical scarcity, underlie
government regulatory power over broadcasting. See supra note 21.
112. The cynic would argue that the practice failed due largely to unenforced regulations and, consequently, deregulation would not, or did not matter.
113. Act of Oct. 18, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 1, 104 Stat. 996 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 609 (Supp. IV 1992)).
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dated cross-subsidization of speech takes various forms including
"must-carry" requirements, 114 leased access channels," 5 - and
mandatory provision of channel space and subsidies for public access,
educational, and governmental [PEG] channels. Although cable monopolies arguably lead to higher prices and reduced quality of service,
an important benefit of monopoly has been a financial surplus, part of
which Congress and local governments can force cable systems to
devote to categories of communications that are not adequately supported by the market.
Assuming that phone company provision of video does not eliminate the need for non-market-supported cable programming, the
question here is whether its provision of video would effect negatively
the government's ability or willingness to force support for this programming. If it would, this effect would provide some justification for
section 533(b). As a practical matter, phone provision probably
would cause this negative effect. Of course, theoretically, the government could impose on telephone providers obligations to support access programming. If, however, phone and cable companies compete,
presumably less "monopoly" profits would exist and, hence, less profits would be available for regulatory transfer to merit access programming. This effect of competition between phone and cable duplicates
the problem created by unregulated new phone competitors of existing local telephone companies skimming off high volume users from
whom the regulated company previously obtained the revenue used to
subsidize universal service.
Moreover, the government is unlikely to impose support obligations if the legal changes directed toward creating competition between phone and cable companies reflect an anti-regulatory, procompetitive agenda. This is illustrated by the FCC's attitude apparent
in the Video Dialtone proceedings." 6 There, the FCC recommended,
with potentially significant caveats, that Congress eliminate section
533(b)." 7 The FCC likewise considered, but refused to require the
telephone company, or other "video gateway" providers, to include
anything similar to cable's PEG offerings. 1' 8 Finally, it rejected the
idea to impose common carrier obligations on video gateways. 119 If
114. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. IV 1992).
115. Id. § 532(b).
116. See Video Dialtone Report, supra note 7.
117. Id. para. 135.
118. Id. para. 92.
119. The decision makes some sense. If different gateways are designed to serve different audience demands, a gateway may become less valuable to recipients if the provider
cannot tailor the content. Still, the decision is troublesome because it permits discrimina-
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some voices were unable to pay for access, the FCC would leave them
to seek redress (that is, funding) from Congress. 120
These FCC rulings suggest that in a video dialtone regime, with
potentially competing video packagers (e.g., competing cable companies), policy makers will find that the competition will make it politically and economically more difficult to effectuate any requirements
to subsidize channels unable to gain market support, even if the need
for these channels remains the same. Likewise, if video gateways offer cable-type programming without being required to subsidize public access, local governments will feel pressured to eliminate access
requirements for cable operators. This consequence should be recognized as one of the negative effects of competition, whether or not
outweighed by positive effects. Still, phone provision of video programming may not make subsidy mandates any less likely (or less
needed and workable) than they are in a video dialtone regime where
phone companies merely transport competing video programming.
Both regimes may equally block the political choice to mandate that
the video provider pay for "merit" programming, which suggests the
need to devise an alternative strategy for making such programming
available.12 ' If the above assumption is correct, then this desire to
assure subsidies for programming that lacks market support helps justify section 533(b) only because, politically, the opposition that a combined phone-cable company would present to imposing policyjustified support obligations would predictably be more formidable
and effective than would the opposition of other video programmers.
Whether this would be the case is unclear.
D.

Corporate Political Power

Shortly after Bell Atlantic and TCI announced plans to merge, a
state Public Utility Commissioner privately bemoaned that Bell Atlantic frequently used its political power to block regulatory moves
tory exclusion of diverse programming by unpopular groups as well as other groups that
lack market support. If this exclusion reflects an anti-competitive agenda it may violate
antitrust laws, but if it reflects ideological censorship the law (absent common carriage)
offers no remedy.
120. Video Dialtone Report, supra note 7, paras. 40, 44, 143. Cf. id. at 5878 (Quello,
partial dissent) (suggesting that cable operators may "avoid franchise obligations through
the simple expedient of becoming 'enhanced gateway service providers"').
121. I tentatively recommend two approaches: a "sales tax" on all video home providers to fund public access and public television video programming; and access to carriage
for this programming on beneficial terms, much like the lifeline services provided to phone
users or the reserved channels provided for non-commercial broadcasters. Cf Video Dialtone Report, supra note 7, para. 40 (recommendation of Massachusetts Community Antenna Television Commission).
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that would benefit the public-but that veterans in the agency feared
that if Bell Atlantic merged with TCI, the resulting entity combine
would run the state in a way not seen since the days when railroads
controlled everything they wanted.122 The Commissioner's worries illustrate the historically obvious fact that an appropriate policy concern is corporate political power. Historically, concern about the
dangers posed to the political order have been embedded in many
government policy decisions, although it sometimes drops out of academic policy analyses influenced by economics. At least since the
Progressive era and early twentieth century, legislation directed at restricting corporate use of money and power to control electoral politics has illustrated the dangers of corporate political power that have
been obvious to many observers.123 Likewise, the potential political
power generated by any huge corporate merger should be a cause of
concern-and the Bell Atlantic/TCI merger would have been the largest merger thus far. However, the dangers of corporate political
power take on added dimensions in the communications field, where
three concerns stand out.
First, media mergers may close off political space that is crucial to
maintain the opportunity to develop a communications order that
would serve a democratic society. The hope for adoption of a policy
initiative that is fully justified by the public interest, but contrary to
the interests of some segments of the industry, often depends on support from some other industry segment that, in addition to any possible public interest motivation, values any burdens imposed on its
competitors. In any event, the division of corporate interests' lobbying power is often essential for political openings. As cable and telephone interests merge, the space for public interest initiatives
involving phone, cable, or related communications formats is likely to
narrow. The declining support for innovations like mandated and
supported PEG channels, discussed above, is an example.
Second, the special objections to the political power that could
result from a structurally unified media relate to the special political
role of media content itself. This country, like most democracies, has
maintained the policy judgment that society is best served by spreading and diversifying control over media content, with the consolidation of the media industries seen as an evil.'24 Although some
122. Conversation with Public Utility Commissioner in a state served by Bell Atlantic
operating companies (Oct. 1993).
123. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 21, at 221.
124. This represents the judgment of all the national commissions, of which I am aware,
as well as this country's Hutchinson Commission study of the press. The first significant
deviation was a lengthy but poorly reasoned report of the United States Department of
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political theorists value the media for its purported role in informing
the public, other observers suggest that media entities may in themselves be the most important constituents of the public because the
government responds more to enraged media executives than to an
enraged public.125 If this is so, the value of diversity in media ownership lies, in part, in that when the media's voice is unified, this unification represents many different segments of the public all being
persuaded. The political role of the media should not merely be as a
unified check on government, but as a forum where a developed consensus can be considered meaningful. In other words, there may be
reasons to conclude the political role of the media is corrupted by too
much unification. From this perspective, section 533(b), like many
special rules dispersing ownership of media entities, is valuable precisely because it promotes the media's special political role.
Finally, the merged company's changed economic interests could
corrupt its media content. There is a widespread view, supported by
anecdotal evidence, that when journalistic or creative values conflict
with profit concerns, larger and more diversified media organizations
maintain comparatively less devotion to journalistic and creative values than do smaller media enterprises. 2 6 In addition, the obvious material incentives to base cultural or news content on economic
interests beyond selling their media product are increased when the
media's corporate owners have additional economic interests, such as
owning non-journalistic enterprises that are potentially affected by
government policies. Widespread unease at having General Electric
(GE) own NBC reflects the fear that GE's economic and related political interests would affect NBC's journalism. A major newspaper
publisher described his worst nightmare as having newspapers fall into
the hands of owners like Mobil Oil. 1 27 Thus, a telephone-cable
Commerce, issued early in 1993, which argued that there is insufficient media concentration in this country and recommended legal changes to allow greater concentration. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA (1993).
125. See, e.g., DAVID L. PROTOSS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM OF OUTRAGE (1991).
126. The social science literature on the consequences of chain ownership is reviewed in
C. Edwin Baker, Ownership of Newspapers: The View From Positivist Social Science
(1994) (Research Paper R-12, Shorenstein Center, Harvard University). See also DOUG
UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAs RULE THE NEWSROOM (1993). Anecdotal accounts are common in books and articles written by former media professionals. See, e.g., JAMES D.
SQUIRES, READ ALL ABOUT IT! THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF AMERICA'S NEWSPAPERS (1993).

127. C.K. McClatchy, How Newspapers Are Owned-And Does it Matter?, Press-Enterprise Lecture Series (1988). One writer suggests the possibility that an oil company's
(ARCO) purchase of a national English newspaper shortly before the award of valuable
North Sea oil leases and selling it later, after getting the leases, might illustrate the greater
value of media properties to conglomerates because the media entities' political value can
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merger could be reasonably opposed on the grounds that it could add
to the incentives to corrupt media content. Likewise, the more powerful entity, fiscally huge and controlling both major transmission facilities and major realm of content sales, is likely to have increased power
or opportunities to effectuate control over content.
In sum, the dangers of merging cable's programming operations
with telephone's public carriage operations should create a number of
presumptions concerning the structure of the communications industries. First, the means of transmission should be operated, as much as
possible, on a common carrier basis. Second, since this will work
more effectively if owners of the transmission infrastructure have no
economic incentive to favor some content over others, the presumption is that the common carrier should not be a provider of communications content. These points carry additional force since there are no
obvious economic or social advantages from combining the two, especially no advantages for them to be combined under phone company
ownership. Surely, these presumptions provide strong support for section 533(b).

HI
The Court Decision
The district court in Potomac Telephone did not see the issue as
described above. Rather, the court rejected the government's argument by overtly misunderstanding its main rationale. The court began
by correctly noting the government's two justifications: "promoting
competition in the video programming market and preserving diversity in the ownership of communications media."' 2 8 It then rejected
the first rationale with the non-sequitur that, since section 533(b)
''serves to bar entry into the market for video transport service by
[telephone companies]," it clearly "restrict[s] competition in the market for video programming by limiting the number of outlets through
which such programming can be distributed."' 12 9 The court is simply
wrong. The statute does not limit outlets through which programming
can be distributed because it does not bar telephone companies from
providing video transport services. As the court correctly observed at
a different point in its opinion, "telephone companies are not precluded . . .from competing in the market for video transport servsupport the conglomerates other interests. P. DUNNET, THE WORLD NEWSPAPER INDUS49, 64 n.22 (1988). This, of course, would constitute an overt corruption of the media's
democratic role.
128. Potomac Telephone, 830 F. Supp. 909, 927 (E.D. Va. 1993).
129. Id.

TRY
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In other words, whether providing for video dialtone or also
allowing telephone provision of (and substitution for) cable programming will best promote competition in video programming is an empirical question about which the court made no relevant observations.
Nevertheless, the court moved on to the government's second
interest, diversity of ownership, which the court took to represent a
government fear that the telephone company will drive cable out of
business. The court argued that the phone company could only drive
out cable by monopolizing the video transport market by, for example, cross-subsidizing video transport with money from phone rate
payers. Since the phone company can already compete in video transport, the court concluded that section 533(b) does not prevent the result the government fears. Therefore, the court reasoned that this
interest could not justify
the law and section 533(b) was not tailored to
13 1
serve the interest.
The court missed the point. As long as the phone company cannot itself offer cable programming, it has no incentive to drive cable
companies out of business, even if it has an incentive to induce cable
companies to use phone lines for carriage of cable programming.
Most important, as long as the phone company operates solely as a
common carrier, any monopoly power over carriage would not provide leverage over programming. In contrast to the district court's
reasoning, the logic of the government's concern with competition and
diversity relates to inhibiting the phone company from using whatever
power it has in the transport market to restrict the programming market-a goal directly furthered by denying the phone company entry
into the program-provision market.
The court reasoned that because the cable industry presently
monopolizes video packaging in most neighborhoods and because,
without the restrictions of section 533(b), the worst the phone company could do is replace this cable monopoly with a phone monopoly,
533(b) at best accomplishes nothing of significance and at worst prevents entrance of a new competitor (the phone company). This reasoning is wrong. Section 533(b) could contribute to a better result.
By allowing the phone company to provide transport but not to be a
program packager (such that it cannot replace cable as a monopolist
in this business), the realistic expectation is that various video packagers, or even independent programmers, will find it economical to deliver their programming over the phone lines. The result would be
ices.

130. Id. at 929. The court also said this fact was "of paramount significance"-which is
not obvious-but at least here the court got the law right. Id.
131. Id. at 930-31.
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increased competition and access by smaller, more diverse entities. In
this way, 533(b) directly serves the government's interest in competition and maybe even its interest in diversity of video programming.
Bruce Owen, as quoted by the court, offers basically the above
justification for section 533(b). 132 If allowed to provide programming,
phone companies' power in the video transport market would allow
them to exercise undue power in the video programming market and
would increase the value to the phone company of monopolizing
transport.

33

The phone company could use its control over transport

by subtly disadvantaging programmers in competition with it, thereby
gaining market power and hence profits in its programming
activities.

134

The court's response was threefold. First, it repeated that "the
essential point" is that telephone companies can already compete in
transport. 35 However, this "essential" point is irrelevant since the issue is what the phone company does in the programming market (as
well as a lesser concern with whether the phone company's involve-

ment in programming increases its incentive to monopolize transport).
Second, the court argued that the evidence about the difficulty of
regulating anti-competitive conduct related only to the transport business, which it thought was irrelevant if the government's concern was
with phone company power in programming. 136 Here the court at
least got it right that the issue is programming. But Owen's unan132. Id. at 930.
133. Id.
134. Henry Geller found a similar ability to exercise power used by another communications transporter, cable, to undermine the government's attempt to create programming
diversity through mandatory leased-access channels. The cable owners' power over transport plus the incentive to control programming caused them to undermine the leased-access system in ways regulators were ineffective at preventing. Geller summed this up with
a comment that would apply equally to telephone company participation in video programming: "[E]xperience with cable has shown that if an entity engages in extensive content
operations as a TV packager, it will do all it can do to resist undermining that packaging
operation with true common carriage availability." GELLER, supra note 53, at 36. Thus,
although the ACLU, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, and the 1974 Report to the President of the Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications all concluded
that cable should primarily lease channel space, that is, be a carrier rather than a programmer, thereby duplicating in cable § 533(b)'s telephone regime by "separat[ing] the control
of the cable medium from control of the messages on it," id. at 17, this policy was not
adopted and instead cable was only required to make a small portion of its space available
for leased access. Having let cable into programming, the leased access channel provision
was a total failure according to the 1990 Senate Report. Id. at 19. Possibly the most telling
example is cable's effective blockage of NBC's plan to operate a cable news channel under
circumstances where NBC would have competed with CNN, in which cable operators had
a substantial equity stake. Id. at 19-21.
135. Potomac Telephone, 830 F. Supp. at 931.
136. Id. at 930.
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swered premise is that the telephone company could use its admittedly hard to regulate power over transport for leverage in
programming. So again, the court's response fails to join issue about
the danger of transport power.
Third, the court asserted that the worst possible outcome would
be the inconsequential move from a cable monopolist to a phone monopolist. 137 This claim ignores the fact that since the telephone monopolist would itself be larger and have control over more aspects of
social life, it would be presumptively more dangerous and, as a practical political matter, harder to control. More importantly, it ignores
the whole rationale of allowing telephone transport of video while
prohibiting provision of programming, namely that this arrangement
is more likely to lead to competition in the programming market.
Thus, invalidating section 533(b) would substantially diminish the
likelihood of developing valuable- competition in programming. The
court's added claim that telephone entry into programming would be
without any "inherent advantage that would enable them to evade effective regulation '131 is simply wrong as long as the phone company
can combine transport and programming in a single product. Only
section 533(b) prevents undue advantage because, without it, the company can make use of its hard to restrict advantage in transport to
favor its own programming activities.
Thus, the court's critique of section 533(b) missed the key government argument. The government should not allow telephone companies to leverage their power in the video transport market to the
video programming market. Rather than rely on any theoretical regulatory capabilities, the inherent difficulties of effective regulation and
the benefits from conserving regulatory resources on the task always
make the preferable solution the creation of structures that require
minimum regulatory oversight. This is what section 533(b) does. The
significant free speech interest in keeping the channels of communication maximally unimpeded so that diverse sources can present communications to the public adequately justifies section 533(b).
IV
Conclusion
Government in this country has always intervened in the communications realm-whether in respect to government owned entities
like the postal service, schools, and libraries, or strongly regulated en137. Id.
138. Id. at 931.
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tities like telegraph and phone, or relatively unregulated entities like
newspapers and magazines. Despite frequent corporate invocations
of the First Amendment as a shield to protect economic interests,
courts should reject, and until now have rejected, these challenges as
long as the government action could be
seen as a plausible means of
139
improving the communications realm.
Four communications-related motives for intervention are: 1) to
promote universal access to society's communications; 2) to prevent
owners of means of transmission from engaging in censorship (common carriage); 3) to subsidize categories of speech that are predictably
under-valued or otherwise neglected by the market; and 4) to assure
that the structure of the communications order does not make the
communications order itself a dangerous roadblock to political
change. All four of these motives could potentially offer support for
section 533(b)'s prohibition of telephone companies entering into the
business of supplying video content. However, the second concern,
and arguably the fourth, provide the strongest basis of support for this
legislation. Society and democracy have little to gain and something
significant to lose by repealing this prohibition.
Nevertheless, the current political (largely corporate) consensus
seems to be moving in the direction of deregulation in the name of
wide open competition as the hoped-for means of stimulating the
quicker development of the "information superhighway." This Article does not comment explicitly on this emerging consensus or the
merits of the vision that it holds out. Clearly, however, in such a
realm, the concerns that have in the past justified regulation will not
go away. If changes in the direction proposed by this consensus occur,
including repeal of provisions such as section 533(b), clearly new interventions in support of the four concerns discussed above will be
needed. Law must impose new obligations and support new structures in order to assure access for speakers (or programmers) to the
information highway to the extent that existing common carrier rules
are eliminated or become inadequate.140 New means to subsidize and
distribute subsidies to speech not adequately supported by the market
must be found. Sources of resources for these subsidies include taxes
139. Of course, the courts have also routinely rejected corporate challenges to laws that
merely apply general economic or tax regulation to the media.
140. Such new rules will require careful formulation if, as some predict, the future valued commodity is not transmission capacity but packaging (editing) such that audiences
are helped to get what they want out of an infinite array of content. In these circumstances
new rules must promote access for marginalized speakers at the same time that it allows
private packagers ability to select (i.e., censor) on behalf of their customers. Here is not
the place to discuss how these two divergent concerns should be combined.
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on provision of carriage services, taxes on advertising, taxes on content sales, or requirements of special transmission opportunities. The
key point is that even if the communications realm changes dramatically with the introduction of new technologies, the need for intervention to protect a vibrant communications environment will not go
away.

